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Sarah E. Oliver∗ 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Children entering foster care increasingly come from non-
traditional families. A number of these children have no legal parent 
present in their lives and the person who has become the 
psychological parent to the child—the “individual the child 
perceives, on a psychological and emotional level, to be his or her 
parent” 1—has no established legal right to custody of the child. 
Child welfare laws in many states fail to account for the growing 
phenomenon of non-traditional family units at the most critical 
stages of dependency proceedings—first, when the child is removed 
from his or her home and second, when the court determines 
whether the circumstances justified the removal. This Article 
illustrates that when someone else raises a child—perhaps a 
grandparent, a stepparent,2 a legal parent’s  
                                                          
* Certified Juvenile/Child Welfare Law Specialist and attorney with the Children’s 
Law Center of California, Los Angeles Office, where she oversees nearly 150 
child welfare cases with over 300 child-clients and appears in court daily in the 
Los Angeles County Superior Court, Juvenile Branch, Dependency Division. J.D., 
Whittier Law School, 2002; B.A., Scripps College, 1997. The views expressed in 
this Article do not necessarily reflect the views of Children’s Law Center of 
California. To learn more about Children’s Law Center of California, the largest 
non-profit, public interest law firm in the nation dedicated solely to protecting the 
rights of abused and neglected children, see www.clcla.org. 
1 See James G. O’Keefe, Note, The Need to Consider Children’s Rights in 
Biological Parent v. Third Party Custody Disputes, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1077, 
1081 (1991) (defining “psychological parent” as the “individual the child 
perceives, on a psychological and emotional level, to be his or her parent”).  
2 Many states define stepparents as relatives rather than parents. See, e.g., CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.3(c)(2) (West 2013) (“‘Relative’ means an adult who is 
related to the child by blood, adoption, or affinity within the fifth degree of 
kinship, including stepparents, stepsiblings, and all relatives whose status is 
1
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same-sex partner,
3
 or any relative who has assumed a parental role—
child welfare laws do not sufficiently protect that relationship unless 
the adult has legal guardianship of the child. Generally, a 
psychological parent who is not the legal guardian to the child has 
no recognized rights during the initial stages of child welfare 
proceedings, and even if the adult meets certain requirements, only a 
few rights are protected thereafter. More can be done to protect this 
relationship when the state intervenes to remove a child from the 
home of a psychological parent, both for the sake of the 
psychological parent and, more importantly, for the best interest of 
the child. 
Part II of this Article begins by providing a background of 
the rights of caregivers in dependency proceedings. Part III 
describes the growing number of non-traditional families in the 
United States. Part IV offers a hypothetical case from California’s 
dependency court—the largest dependency system in the country—
to illustrate how a psychological parent would be treated under 
                                                                                                                                      
preceded by the words ‘great,’ ‘great-great,’ or ‘grand,’ or the spouse of any of 
these persons even if the marriage was terminated by death or dissolution.”); OHIO 
ADMIN. CODE 5101:2-1-01(212)(b) (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(15) (West 
2013); see also In re Jodi B., 278 Cal. Rptr. 242, 246 (Ct. App. 1991) (“A 
stepparent is not a ‘parent’ for the purposes of reunification of a child removed 
from the home in the course of [dependency] proceedings.”). Some states exclude 
stepparents from both the definition of parent and relative. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 39.01(49), (64) (West 2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.024 (West 
2013).  
3
 In California, if the same-sex couple files a “Declaration of Domestic 
Partnership” with the California Secretary of State, they are entitled to the same 
parental rights and responsibilities as spouses under the California Domestic 
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act provided that the child of the partnership is 
born to either of them after the effective date of the statute, January 1, 2005. CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2013). If the same-sex couple has a child outside the 
context of a domestic partnership or adoption, or the child of a domestic 
partnership was born prior to December 31, 2004, the non-biological same-sex 
partner would bear the burden of establishing presumed parent status by a 
preponderance of the evidence. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2013); see Elisa B. 
v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666-67 (Cal. 2005) (applying the concepts for 
establishing paternity under California Family Code Section 7611 to a member of a 
same-sex couple without genetic ties to the children).   
2
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California’s current child welfare laws.4 Part V describes how 
California courts have attempted to better protect the relationship of 
the child and psychological parent through the judicial creation of 
the de facto parent doctrine. Part V also explains why this doctrine, 
as currently constructed, is an inadequate remedy, and then offers a 
simple solution for California. Part VI outlines how other states have 
adopted the de facto parent doctrine, or an equivalent policy, to 
address the role of the psychological parent in proceedings 
impacting non-traditional families. Finally, this Article argues that 
current child welfare laws do not sufficiently protect the relationship 
of the psychological parent and child at its most critical point—
when the state intervenes to remove the child. Providing greater 
protections for this unique relationship by allowing psychological 
parents to participate in dependency proceedings from their onset 
would better inform courts of children’s unique histories and their 
needs moving forward. 
 
II. Rights of Caregivers in Dependency Proceedings 
 
Only mothers, presumed fathers, and adoptive parents are 
considered legal parents within the scope of most states’ child 
welfare statutes.
5
 Likewise, in twenty-seven states, individuals who 
                                                          
4
 California was chosen as a focus of this Article for several reasons. First, 
California has the largest dependency court system in the country. Second, it has a 
far greater number of children in foster care than any other state. Third, and most 
importantly, the number of children living in non-traditional families in California 
increased by fifty percent over the last decade, greatly outpacing every other state. 
See infra Part III. Consequently, the growing phenomenon of non-traditional 
families is most evident in California and the consequences of failing to recognize 
psychological parents in dependency proceedings are best exemplified in 
California’s dependency court system.   
5
 Cf. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7500-7507 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(49) 
(West 2013); MICH. CT. R. 3.903(A)(7); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.080 (West 
2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.024(a) (West 2013) (“Parent means the 
mother, a man presumed to be the father, a man legally determined to be the father, 
a man who has been adjudicated to be the father by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, a man who has acknowledged his paternity under applicable law, or an 
adoptive mother or father.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(15) (West 2013). See also 
3
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obtained their guardianship through probate court—legal 
guardians—are the only other individuals who share the same rights 
as parents in dependency proceedings.
6
 These rights include: 1) the 
                                                                                                                                      
In re Merrick V., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 490, 507 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding that, under the 
circumstances of the case, grandmother could not assert status as de facto parent); 
In re Carrie W., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 47 (Ct. App. 2003) (limiting standing in 
dependency cases to parents and “legal” guardians); In re Emily R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 285, 292 (Ct. App. 2000) (distinguishing between an alleged biological father 
and a presumed father under statutory definition as it is relates to standing to 
request reunification services); In re Zacharia D., 862 P.2d 751, 760 (Cal. 1993) 
(noting that de facto and stepparents are not included in the meaning of the word 
“parent” in California dependency courts); In re Sarah C., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 
417 (Ct. App. 1992) (treating the word “parent” in statute as “a person upon whom 
that status has been legally conferred”). Note that, in California, Senate Bill 1476, 
which was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown on September 30, 2012, would have 
authorized courts to recognize more than two legal parents when it is in the best 
interest of the child. See Governor Makes Final Decision on Dozens Bills Before 
Deadline Passes, SACRAMENTO OBSERVER, Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://sacobserver.com/2012/10/governor-makes-final-decision-on-dozens-bills-
before-deadline-passes/. This article does not contemplate the expansion of the 
definition of legal parent under California law, rather the extension of the rights 
that are accorded to legal guardians to psychological parents solely for the purpose 
of dependency proceedings.  
6
 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.180(h) (West 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
8-221 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(h)(1)(A) (West 2012); CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 317(a), (b) (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-202 (West 
2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-135(b) (West 2013); DEL. R. FAM. CT. R. 
CIV. P. 206(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.013(9)(a) (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 
15-11-98(b) (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2009 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 38-2202(u)-(v) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(1)(c) (West 
2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 608 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201(1) 
(West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-425(2) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
169-C:10 II(a) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7A-451(a)(12), 7B-602(a) (West 
2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-26 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2151.352 (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.205(1) (West 2013); 23 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2313(a.1) (West 2013); TENN. R. JUV. P. R. 39; TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. §§ 262.109, 262.201 (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-201(a) 
(West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(D) (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 26.44.115, 26.44.120 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.53 (West 
2013). But see infra note 8 (listing state laws that allow courts to appoint counsel 
in child welfare proceedings for parents, guardians, custodians, and other parties 
who do not have an established legal relationship to the child). 
4
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right to notice;
7
 2) the right to appear with counsel;
8
 3) standing to 
participate fully in all proceedings;
9
 4) the right to physical custody 
of the child;
10
 5) the right to visitation;
11
 6) the right to appeal;
12
 and 
                                                          
7
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 290.1(a) (West 2013); CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 290.1(a)(6) (stating that notice is required solely to parents and then to 
relatives, only if no parent or guardian is found); see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 3-815(c)(3) (West 2013) (providing notice of shelter care hearing to 
parents, guardian, custodian, or relatives, if located); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
119, § 29 (West 2013); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1023 (McKinney 2013); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 262.109 (West 2013) (providing that notice is only required to the 
parent, conservator, or legal guardian); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.115, 
26.44.120 (West 2013).  
8
 See ALA. CODE § 12-15-210 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (2013); 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 316 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-
202(1) (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 16-2304(b)(1) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
587A-34 (West 2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50/13B(c) (West 2013); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 31-32-4-2 (West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.113 (West 2013); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(1)(c) (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 
4005(2) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-820 (West 2013); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29 (West 2013); MICH. CT. R. 3.915(B)(1)(a)(i); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163(3)(b) (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.211 
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-279.01(1) (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 128.100 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-10.B (West 2012); 
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(a) (McKinney 2013); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(g); 
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1033-b (McKinney 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 24 
(West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-7.1(b)(4) (West 2012); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 20-7-110 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-31 (2012); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-6-1111 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-2-16 (West 2013); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-211 (West 2013).  
9
 See supra note 6. 
10
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 319(b) (West 2013) (“The court shall order 
release of the child from custody unless a prima facie showing has been made that 
the child comes within Section 300, the court finds that continuance in the parent’s 
or guardian’s home is contrary to the child’s welfare,” and any one of four 
circumstances indicating substantial danger exist). 
11
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 362.1(a)(1)(A) (West 2013) (providing that 
visitation between the parent or guardian and child shall be as frequent as possible, 
consistent with the well-being of the child). 
12
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 307.4(a)(2) (West 2013); CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 366.26 (West 2013); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 395 (West 2013). 
5
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7) the right to reunification services.
13
 These seven rights, while not 
universal, are essential to protect the relationship of the child and 
parent or guardian, and in most states, are enjoyed by legal 
guardians and parents at every stage of dependency proceedings. 
Yet, psychological parents who never obtained legal guardianship—
perhaps due to financial hardship or for lack of opportunity, 
understanding, or education—do not share these rights at the 
preliminary stages of dependency proceedings. As a result, when the 
state intervenes to remove a child from the psychological parent’s 
care, the psychological parent has no opportunity to be heard and no 
ability to challenge the righteousness of that decision. 
The obstacles to obtaining legal guardianship of a child are 
real. In California, for example, procuring a legal guardianship 
through probate court is both complicated and expensive, costing 
upward of one thousand dollars in court fees alone.
14
 The California 
Courts’ website15 advises that while an individual does not need a 
                                                          
13
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358.1 (West 2013); cf. In re Merrick V., 19 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 490, 500 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding that, under the circumstances of the 
case, grandmother could not assert status as de facto parent); In re Carrie W., 2 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 39 (Ct. App. 2003) (limiting standing in dependency cases to 
parents and “legal” guardians); In re Emily R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 285, 292 (Ct. App. 
2000) (distinguishing between an alleged biological father and a presumed father 
under statutory definition relative to standing to request reunification services); In 
re Zacharia D., 862 P.2d 751, 760 (Cal. 1993) (noting that de facto and stepparents 
are not included in the meaning of the word “parent” in California dependency 
courts); In re Sarah C., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 417 (Ct. App. 1992) (treating the 
word “parent” in statute as “a person upon whom that status has been legally 
conferred.”). 
14
 PUB. COUNSEL, GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND THE PRO PER 
GUARDIANSHIP CLINIC 3 (2012), 
http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/publications/files/Guardianship-of-the-person-
and-the-pro-per-guardianship-clinic.pdf (stating that “[t]he court fees are 
$1325.00” to file for guardianship over a child but noting that fee waivers are 
available for certain qualified individuals); see Guardianship Forms, CAL. 
COURTS: JUD. BRANCH CAL., http://www.courts.ca.gov/1214.htm (last visited Aug. 
20, 2012) (listing over twenty forms required to ask for guardianship over a child). 
15
 See Guardianship Forms, supra note 14.  
6
Children's Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol33/iss2/4
Children’s Legal Rights Journal    Volume 33, Fall 2013   
 
Adapting to the Modern Family  
 
273 
 
lawyer to obtain guardianship through probate court,
16
 the individual 
“must file papers with the court and go through a number of steps 
leading up to a court hearing. . . . [a]nd most people make 
mistakes.”17 In Texas, the Texas Guardianship Association advises 
that an individual seeking guardianship over a child will need the 
assistance of a family law attorney.
18
   
A caretaker who is neither a parent nor an established legal 
guardian, but who has the financial means and ability to navigate the 
probate system can obtain legal guardianship over the child. 
Thereafter, if dependency proceedings are initiated, that caretaker 
will be afforded with all the same rights as a legal parent in similar 
proceedings.
19
 Conversely, a similarly situated non-parent caretaker 
who is unable to obtain legal guardianship will have no rights during 
the preliminary hearings of the child welfare case. Using California’s 
child welfare law as an example, this Article will illustrate the 
disparity between similarly situated non-parent caretakers. Currently, 
only psychological parents who qualify as de facto parents—
individuals who fulfilled the parental role on a day-to-day basis—
under California law
20
 are awarded limited rights in dependency 
proceedings. Moreover, these rights may only be granted during the 
dispositional and later hearings, which occur well after the crucial 
initial and adjudicatory hearings.  
Non-parent caretakers who have become the psychological 
parent to the child may share the same degree of kinship to the child, 
may have assumed the same parental roles for the same period of 
time, and dependency proceedings may have been initiated for 
                                                          
16
 A probate court is a specialized court that deals in administration of estates and 
other related matters.  
17
 See Becoming a Guardian, CAL. COURTS: JUD. BRANCH CAL., 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/1212.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2012).  
18
 See TEX. GUARDIANSHIP ASS’N, http://www.texasguardianship.org (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013).  
19
 See supra note 6.  
20
 See CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 5.502(10) (defining de facto parent as “a person 
who has been found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role 
of parent, fulfilling the child’s physical and psychological needs for care and 
affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period”); see also infra 
Part V (for an explanation of the de facto parent doctrine).   
7
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exactly the same reasons, but the law will treat the non-parent 
caretakers differently. This Article argues that it is time to reconsider 
and expand the rights of psychological parents in order to reflect 
current mores and to better protect the child in the judicial system.  
 
III. The Phenomenon of Non-Traditional Families is Growing 
Nationally 
 
The number of children living in households maintained by 
grandparents or other relatives is increasing nationwide. While the 
number of children living in households with no legal parent present 
has remained at a steady 4 percent over the last fifty years,
21
 the 
number of grandparent-head households—households that may or 
may not include a legal parent—increased from 3 percent to 5 
percent between 1970 and 1992.
22
 In 1970, 2.2 million children lived 
in grandparent-head households, 2.3 million in 1980, and 3.3 million 
in 1992.
23
 This trend became even more noteworthy in 1992, when 
the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held hearings on the 
growing numbers of “grandparents as parents.”24 By 1997, the 
number further increased to 3.9 million children (5.5 percent), and 31 
percent of those children had no legal parent living in the family 
household.
25
 By 2012, the number of grandparent-head households 
reached 5.4 million,
26
 and of that number, 1.45 million children were 
living in households with no legal parent present.
27
 In fact, a total of 
                                                          
21
 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 1960 TO 2012, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/graphics/CH-1.pdf. 
22
 KEN BRYSON & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT 
POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES: CORESIDENT GRANDPARENTS AND 
GRANDCHILDREN 1 (1999), http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p23-198.pdf. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id.  
25
 Id. 
26
 See Profile America Facts for Features, Grandparents Day 2012: Sept. 9, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU NEWS (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/cb12ff-17_grandparents.pdf. 
27
 See America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2012, tbl.C4, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/cps2012.html (last visited Apr. 
28, 2013).  
8
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2.6 million children in 2012 were living in households that had no 
legal parent present but were headed by a grandparent, relative, or 
other non-parent caretaker.
28
 
According to a recent study, families are also relying on 
kinship care at a much higher rate than in years past.
29
 Kinship care 
describes situations in which children are cared for full time by blood 
relatives or other adults, such as godparents or close family friends.
30
 
This arrangement may be formal with state-supervised placement of 
the child, or informal through a family arrangement and without state 
supervision or secured legal custody of the child.
31
 Today, close 
family friends and extended family members provide care for more 
than 2.7 million children in the United States, an increase of almost 
18 percent over the past decade.
32
 The vast majority of these children 
live in informal kinship care arrangements without any child 
protective services involvement, state supervision, or formal legal 
custody.
33
 
California, the nation’s most populous state, serves as an 
example of this phenomenon. In California, almost half a million 
children under the age of eighteen, approximately 6.4 percent, lived 
in grandparent-head households in 1990.
34
 From 1990 to 2000, there 
was a 50 percent increase in this type of living situation, more than 
                                                          
28
 Id. 
29
 See THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., STEPPING UP FOR KIDS: WHAT GOVERNMENT 
AND COMMUNITIES SHOULD DO TO SUPPORT KINSHIP FAMILIES 4 (2012), 
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/KIDS%20COUNT/S/SteppingUpfor
Kids2012PolicyReport/SteppingUpForKidsPolicyReport2012.pdf (citing 
Population Reference Bureau’s analysis of the 2009, 2010, and 2011 Current 
Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Survey).  
30
 Id. 
31
 See id. at 1. 
32
 See id. (citing Population Reference Bureau’s analysis of the 2009, 2010, and 
2011 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Survey and noting 
that 104,000 of the children in kinship placements have been placed formally as 
part of a state-supervised foster care system). 
33
 See id. at 2.  
34
 Mary L. Blackburn, Grandchildren Raised by Grandparents a Troubling Trend, 
CAL. AGRIC., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 10, 11 (citing the U.S. Census). 
9
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any other state in the nation.
35
 By 2009, almost 300,000 of 
California’s children lived in households headed by a grandparent 
and 75,349 of those children had no legal parent present in the 
home.
36
 Further, by 2010, almost a quarter of California’s 126,000 
same-sex headed households were raising children.
37
 The growing 
number of non-traditional families should not be ignored.    
As the number of non-traditional families increases, so do 
their representative numbers in the child welfare system. In 2011, 
approximately 6.2 million children came into contact with child 
protective services through 3.4 million referrals of abuse or neglect.
38
 
In 2011, there were over 400,000 children in foster care 
nationwide.
39
 California’s foster care population was the highest of 
any state in the nation with 55,000 children in foster care 
placements.
40
 The state with the second largest foster care population 
                                                          
35
 Meredith Minkler & Donna Odierna, California’s Grandparents Raising 
Children: What the Aging Network Needs to Know as it Implements the National 
Family Caregiver Support Program 1 (2001), 
http://cssr.berkeley.edu/pdfs/CAgrandparents_entire.pdf. 
36
 CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, STATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 2010, at C-5 (2010), 
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/state-of-
americas-children-2010-report-family-structure.pdf. In 2002, California’s 
Legislature acknowledged the concerning number of children in foster care with 
the adoption of Welfare & Institutions Code Section 16010.4, which states, “[t]he 
Legislature finds and declares all of the following: The State of California is 
guardian to more than 90,000 children in foster care, more than any other state in 
the nation. As of 2002, California has a disproportionately high number of children 
in foster care. While the state is home to 12 percent of the nation’s population, it 
guards over 20 percent of the nation’s children in its foster care system. Thirty-five 
percent of foster children live with relatives.” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 
16010.4(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added).  
37
 Lanz Christian Bañes, Vallejo Among the Top Cities in the Bay Area for Gay 
Couples, VALLEJO TIMES-HERALD, June 26, 2011, 
http://www.timesheraldonline.com/news/ci_18356679?source=pkg. 
38
 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD 
MALTREATMENT: 2011, at viii (2012), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm11.pdf.  
39
 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS 
REPORT 1 (2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport19.pdf. 
40
 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOSTER CARE 
FY 2003-FY 2011 ENTRIES, EXITS, AND NUMBERS OF CHILDREN IN CARE ON THE 
10
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was Texas, with 30,000 children.
41
 The third, fourth, and fifth largest 
foster care populations were in New York, Florida, and Illinois, 
respectively, and each of these three states had nearly 20,000 
children in foster care.
42
 Undoubtedly, a number of these children 
came from non-traditional families with no legal parent present in 
their life. Unless a legal guardianship was already established, the 
person standing in loco parentis
43
 has no rights under current 
dependency law when a child welfare case is initiated.     
As the state with the nation’s largest foster care population, 
California provides a compelling example of the problems that occur 
when the state fails to recognize non-traditional families. An analysis 
of California’s laws demonstrates that the existing system does not 
do enough to protect these modern families. This example, in 
conjunction with an explanation of other states’ laws that do not 
grant rights to non-traditional parents, illustrates how current laws 
fail these modern families at their most critical moment—during the 
preliminary hearings of child welfare cases when the court first 
determines whether the state’s intrusion and the removal of the child 
from the home is justified. 
 
IV. An Illustrative Case in California Dependency Court 
 
Imagine a ten-year-old child who has been raised from the 
age of two by her maternal grandmother.
44
 The child’s birth mother 
is deceased and the biological father listed on the birth certificate has 
never contacted the child. The grandmother has a high school 
education and struggles financially but manages month-to-month. 
                                                                                                                                      
LAST DAY OF EACH FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR (2012), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/entryexit2011.pdf.  
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Latin for “in place of a parent” and meaning “[o]f, relating to, or acting as a 
temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, talking on all or some of the 
responsibilities of a parent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009) (citing 
as an example that, during the school day, a teacher may act in loco parentis).  
44
 This is a hypothetical case that is loosely based on a fact pattern drawn from 
numerous cases that the Author has worked on in her dependency practice.  
11
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She maintains a small home and always attends to all of the child’s 
needs—medical, educational, or otherwise. A legal guardianship was 
never established because of the financial burden in hiring a family 
attorney.   
The child understands that her caretaker is her grandmother 
and not her mother, but she perceives her grandmother to be her 
parent—a day-to-day caretaker who has always acted in a parental 
role. One day, an uncle who briefly visits the family home abuses the 
child. The state’s child protective services agency is notified, an 
investigation is conducted, and the allegations of the referral are 
substantiated.
45
 A risk assessment is then conducted by the child 
protective services agency to determine whether it is safe to leave the 
child in the grandmother’s home. Because the grandmother has no 
established legal right to custody of the child, the parents’ 
whereabouts are unknown, and the referral is substantiated, a 
decision is made to remove the child from the grandmother’s home 
and place her in foster care.
46
  
The child protective services agency then files a petition 
alleging, in part, that the legal parents made an inappropriate plan for 
the child by leaving her with the grandmother who placed the child at 
risk.
47
 The petition further alleges that the maternal grandmother 
endangered the child by allowing the uncle access when she 
reasonably should have known that he posed a risk to the child.
48
 At 
                                                          
45
 California’s Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act defines neglect as harm or 
threatened harm to the health or welfare of a child, or the failure to protect a child 
from such harm, by a person responsible for the child’s welfare. Abuse includes 
the endangering of the health of the child, non-accidental physical injury or death, 
sexual assault or exploitation, and unlawful corporal punishment or injury. CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 11165.2–11165.6 (West 2013).   
46
 L.A. CNTY. DEP’T OF CHILD. & FAM. SERVS., PROCEDURAL GUIDE 0070-529.10, 
ASSESSING ALLEGATIONS OF PHYSICAL ABUSE (2010), 
http://file.lacounty.gov/dcfs/cms1_171505.pdf. 
47
 A petition includes the facts alleging that the child has been abused or neglected 
as defined in California’s Welfare and Institutions Code. See CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE §§ 332, 333 (West 2013). 
48
 See, e.g., In re Bryan D., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 821-25  (Ct. App. 2011) 
(explaining a situation where maternal grandmother was the psychological parent 
to the child when the Department of Children and Family Services removed the 
12
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the initial hearing that is held within seventy-two hours of the child’s 
removal,
49
 the grandmother may receive notice that her grandchild 
was taken into protective custody by child protective services, and 
notice that a written statement is available to explain the “parent’s or 
guardian’s procedural rights and the preliminary stages of the 
dependency proceedings.”50 The grandmother, however, would not 
have standing to answer the petition in court even though this is the 
hearing where the court decides whether continued placement of the 
child in foster care is necessary.
51
    
The next hearing is the jurisdictional hearing, which should 
occur within fifteen court days of the initial hearing if the child is 
removed,
52
 but due to court congestion, often occurs two or three 
months later. During the jurisdictional hearing, the court determines 
the veracity of the petition.
53
 While the referral regarding the abuse 
was investigated and substantiated by child protective services, it is 
not until the jurisdictional hearing that the court decides whether, in 
fact, that abuse occurred. Again, the child’s grandmother has no right 
to notice
54
 or standing
55
 at this hearing. This would also be true for 
                                                                                                                                      
child from the home and the maternal grandmother was named in the petition, 
which alleged that she placed the child at risk). 
49
 The initial hearing is often referred to as the “detention hearing” because the 
court decides whether it is still necessary to detain the child. The hearing must be 
held within 72 hours of the child’s removal from the home and it is at this hearing 
that parents and legal guardians are informed of the allegations in the petition. See 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 315, 316, 317, 319 (West 2013).  
50
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 307.4 (West 2013).  
51
 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2013) (defining ‘Guardian’ as legal 
guardian of the child); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 316 (West 2013). 
52
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 355, 355.1, 356 (West 2013). 
53
 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 355, 355.1, 356. 
54
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 290.1(a)(6) (West 2013) (stating that notice is 
required solely to parents and then to relatives only if no parent is found) (“If there 
is no parent or guardian residing in California, or if the residence is unknown, then 
[notice is required] to any adult relative residing within the county or if none, the 
adult relative residing nearest the court.”); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 
290.2(a)(6), 309(e)(1) (West 2013) (stating that following the initial removal of the 
child the social worker is to conduct an investigation to identify and locate 
grandparents, adult siblings, and other relatives and this investigation is to be 
13
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any individual other than a legal parent or legal guardian. If no 
parent is present, the petition will likely be sustained as pled and the 
court will declare the child a dependent, meaning the child is 
formally within the jurisdiction of the court, and under the formal 
supervision of the court and child welfare services.
56
 The child’s 
grandmother, like all non-parent caretakers who are not considered 
legal parents and do not have standing, would have no opportunity to 
challenge the truth of the petition and no right to appeal the court’s 
decision.
57
 
Two to three months later, at the dispositional hearing, the 
child’s grandmother finally has an opportunity to participate in the 
proceedings. At the dispositional hearing the court decides the proper 
disposition of the child—whether the child is released or placed 
under court supervision, visitation orders, family reunification 
services, or any other necessary protective orders.
58
 The child’s 
grandmother, like all non-parent caretakers, will be allowed to 
participate in this hearing only if she overcomes the obstacles to 
establishing de facto parent status,
59
 which requires her to prove de 
                                                                                                                                      
completed by the disposition hearing unless the relative’s history of family 
violence makes notice inappropriate).  
55
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 316 (West 2013). 
56
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 356 (West 2013) (“After hearing the evidence, 
the court shall make a finding . . . whether or not the minor is a person described 
by Section 300 and the specific subdivisions of Section 300 under which the 
petition is sustained.”). 
57
 See generally In re Miguel E., 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 539 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(finding that grandparents do not have standing to appeal decisions by the 
dependency courts as de facto parents or as relatives). 
58
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358 (West 2013).  
59
 See CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 5.502(10) (defining de facto parent as “a person 
who has been found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role 
of parent, fulfilling the child’s physical and psychological needs for care and 
affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period”); In re Merrick 
V., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 490, 505 (Ct. App. 2004); In re Leticia S., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
810, 813 (Ct. App. 2001); In re Matthew P., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 273-74 (Ct. App. 
1999) (outlining the rights of de facto parents); cf. In re Patricia L., 11 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 631, 634 (Ct. App. 1992) (describing that factors considered in granting de 
facto status are: the child’s psychological bond to the adult; adult’s assumption of 
the day-to-day parental role; adult’s possession of unique information about the 
14
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facto parenthood by a preponderance of the evidence.
60
 When a 
person’s conduct has contributed to the grounds for dependency 
jurisdiction, as is the case in this hypothetical, that person is 
generally prohibited from attaining de facto parent status,
61
 meaning 
that the burden on the grandmother would be significant.
62
 
Moreover, even as a de facto parent at the disposition and subsequent 
proceedings, the child’s grandmother would only have the right to 
appear with counsel and present evidence, but no right to 
reunification services, custody, or visitation with the child.
63
    
In California, neither a non-party nor a non-relative would 
have standing to challenge the detention or removal order, but a 
relative would at least be able to request that the child be placed in 
her home
64
 and be allowed to appeal the denial of a placement.
65
 
This right to seek and appeal placement decisions is limited, 
however, to certain relatives as defined by California law and does 
not include extended relatives, non-relatives, and other potential 
psychological parents.
66
 Moreover, the child may only be placed 
with a relative who is a licensed or certified foster parent with no 
criminal record
67
 or, alternatively, with a relative for whom a 
                                                                                                                                      
child; adult’s regular attendance of court proceedings; and permanent foreclosure 
of contact between the adult and child as a result of future proceedings).   
60
 See In re Joshuia S., 252 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109 (Ct. App. 1988). 
61
 See In re Kieshia E., 859 P.2d 1290, 1296-97 (Cal. 1993) (holding that an 
individual who abused the child was not entitled to de facto parent status); In re 
Leticia S., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813.  
62
 See, e.g., In re Kieshia E., 859 P.2d at 1300-11.  
63
 Cf. In re P.L., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6, 8-9 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that while de 
facto parents are given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings, that status 
does not give them the same rights accorded to a parent or legal guardian). 
64
 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.3 (West 2013). 
65
 See Cesar V. v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 251-52 (Ct. App. 2001). 
66
 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.3(c)(2) (West 2013) (“[O]nly the following 
relatives shall be given preferential consideration for the placement of the child: an 
adult who is a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling.”). 
67
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(20)(A) (West 2013) (prohibiting states from giving 
final approval to a potential foster parent who has certain crimes in his or her 
background); see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1522 (West 2013); D.C. 
MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 6007 (2013) (listing multiple requirements kin must meet 
15
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criminal records exemption has been granted.
68
 If the relative does 
not meet these specific statutory requirements, the child cannot be 
placed in his or her home. 
So, while the grandmother could be considered as a 
placement for the child,
69
 unlike a legal parent or legal guardian, she 
would not be entitled to placement.
70
 Additionally, as a result of the 
child abuse referral, the child’s grandmother would also be listed on 
California’s Child Abuse Central Index (“CACI”),71 a database of 
known or suspected child abusers that is available to a broad array of 
government agencies, employers, and law enforcement agencies. 
Many public and private entities in California are required to consult 
                                                                                                                                      
before licensure); In re Summer H., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 682, 688 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.4 (West 2013)). 
68
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 80040, 89240 (2013) (explaining that when a 
relative seeking placement has a record of criminal convictions, a social worker for 
the social services agency may seek an exemption from the Caregiver Background 
Check Bureau (CBCB) of the Community Care Licensing Division of California’s 
Department of Social Services); see In re S.W., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 199 (Ct. 
App. 2005) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1526, 1551 (West 2013)).  
69
 “Placement” or “to place a child” in this context means the home where the child 
resides or to allow the child to reside in that home.  
70
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361.3(a), 361.4, 361.45 (West 2013); In re 
Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 720 (Cal. 1994) (en banc). But see Cesar V., 111 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 251-52 (holding that the grandmother, although not a party, has 
standing to seek appellate review, which is a petition for extraordinary relief, of the 
denial of her request for placement under California Welfare and Institutions Code 
Section 361.3). 
71
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 309(d) (West 2013). California’s Child Abuse 
Central Index (CACI) is necessary for screening caretakers in compliance with the 
federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, but must provide for 
expunction of unsubstantiated or false claims to receive federal funding under 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 
309(d)(3). A person’s fundamental liberty interest in reputation may be violated if 
inappropriately included on the registry, but the person must prove that inclusion 
on the registry will damage reputation and that a right or status previously 
recognized by state law was distinctly altered or ended. See Humphries v. Cnty. of 
L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1188 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 131 S. 
Ct. 447 (2010) (solely on the issue of whether Los Angeles County, as a 
municipality, is liable for the deprivation, holding that the Monell v. New York City 
Dep’t of Soc. Services’ “policy or custom” requirement applies in Section 1983 
cases irrespective of whether the relief sought is monetary or prospective). 
16
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the database before making hiring, licensing, and custody 
decisions.
72
 Further, being listed on CACI, whether the allegation is 
substantiated or unsubstantiated, often precludes any person, other 
than a legal parent, from consideration as a potential placement for 
the child.
73
  
Moreover, even if the child’s grandmother is not listed on the 
index, she must still meet the federal requirements of the Adam 
Walsh Child and Safety Act of 2006
74
 and the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act (“ASFA”) of 199775 in order to request that her 
grandchild be placed in her home. This is true for all non-parent 
caretakers. Under these federal laws, as incorporated in California, if 
the grandmother was convicted of any crime greater than a minor 
traffic offense at any point in her life, then the child could not be 
placed in her home, unless the director of the State Department of 
Social Services grants an exemption.
76
 This exemption is not 
required when a legal parent seeks the child’s placement in his or her 
home.  
In sum, when the child’s grandmother is not a party to the 
initial proceedings and does not have standing, she has no right to 
                                                          
72
 See Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1177-78 (explaining that information in the CACI is 
made available to the California State Department of Social Services, any county 
licensing agency, persons “‘making inquiries for purposes of pre-employment 
background investigations for peace officers, child care licensing or employment, 
adoption, or child placement,’” and to out-of-state agencies in certain 
circumstances and observing that “it is apparent that the CACI listing plays an 
integral role in obtaining many rights under California law”) (citation omitted). 
73
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 309(d)(1) (West 2013) (noting that the county 
welfare department shall assess any able and willing relative who requests 
placement pending detention and the assessment shall include a home inspection 
for safety and consideration of the results of criminal record check and of 
allegations of prior child abuse). See generally Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1186 
(describing the CACI in detail, finding that a listing on the index is 
“unquestionably stigmatizing,” holding that the Fourteenth Amendment required 
the State to provide those on the list with notice and a hearing, and holding Los 
Angeles County liable for the deprivation), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010).  
74
 Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16911–16929 (West 
2013). 
75
 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(2) (West 2013). 
76
 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1522(a)(4)(B) (West 2013). 
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challenge the veracity of the petition.
77
 If no other biological or legal 
parent appears, the petition will likely go unchallenged, be sustained 
as pled, and the grandmother would not have standing to appeal.
78
 
Consequently, the grandmother would have no meaningful 
opportunity to reunite with her grandchild, as California law only 
provides reunification services for the mother, the legal guardian, 
and the presumed father.
79
 The court has discretion to extend 
reunification services to the non-presumed biological father if he 
meets certain requirements,
80
 but not to former legal guardians,
81
 de 
facto parents,
82
 or stepparents.
83
  
The child would be removed from the only parent who she 
knows and, unless the father suddenly comes forward or an 
appropriate relative is found, the child would be placed in foster care 
with strangers. What is worse, regardless of whether the child is 
placed with the father or another relative, the child would have no 
opportunity to reunify with her only psychological parent. The 
trauma of severing the secure attachment between a child and 
caregiver can be profound for the child, altering brain development 
                                                          
77
 E.g., In re Zacharia D., 862 P.2d 751, 759-60 (Cal. 1993); In re Miguel E., 15 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 539 (Ct. App. 2004); In re Merrick V., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 490, 507 
(Ct. App. 2004); In re Carrie W., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 49 (Ct. App. 2003); In re 
Emily R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 285, 292 (Ct. App. 2000); In re Sarah C., 11 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 414, 420 (Ct. App. 1992). 
78
 See In re Miguel E., 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 539 (stating that grandparents who have 
not applied for or achieved de facto parent status are merely relatives, not parties 
entitled to appeal). 
79
 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2013). 
80
 A man who has established that he is the biological father to the child, but who 
has not established presumed father status, is not entitled to reunification services 
unless he proves that the reunification services will benefit the child. See CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a); In re Zacharia D., 862 P.2d at 764-65. 
81
 If the court removes a child and terminates the guardianship that was established 
through either probate court or dependency court, the former guardian is no longer 
the guardian and thus not entitled to services. The court may remove the child, 
leave the guardianship intact, and offer reunification services. In re Alicia O., 39 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 119, 123-24 (Ct. App. 1995).  
82
 See Clifford S. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333, 338 (Ct. App. 1995). 
83
 See In re Jodi B., 278 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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and causing long-term effects across many domains, including the 
child’s physical, emotional, and mental development.84 
This scenario is common. A seemingly ever more usual 
scenario involves a drug-addicted single mother whose whereabouts 
are unknown. Add an unknown father to the mix, eliminating the 
possibility of paternal relative placement, and the likelihood of the 
child’s placement with strangers in foster care is even higher. The 
above hypothetical case demonstrates the need to rethink how the 
law views psychological parents’ rights, in order to reflect the 
current increase in non-traditional families and provide better 
protection to the child in the judicial system.  
Granting psychological parents the same rights as legal 
guardians from the onset of a dependency case would be the best 
means to protect the relationship of the psychological parent and 
child, but would require significant changes to current child welfare 
laws in many states. A smaller and more manageable first step would 
be for courts to treat psychological parents like de facto parents at the 
beginning of the dependency case—with fewer rights than legal 
guardians, but at least the opportunity to appear with counsel and 
present evidence at each hearing. If a psychological parent would 
otherwise qualify as a de facto parent when the state seeks to 
                                                          
84
 See Erin R. Barnett & Jessica Hamblen, Trauma, PTSD, and Attachment in 
Infants and Young Children, U.S. DEP’T VETERAN’S AFF.: NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD 
(Dec. 17, 2009), 
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/trauma_ptsd_attachment.asp 
(discussing the importance of the child-caregiver attachment); see also CHILD 
WELF. INFO. GATEWAY, UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF MALTREATMENT ON 
BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 9 (2009) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF 
MALTREATMENT ON BRAIN DEVELOPMENT], 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/brain_development/brain_develop
ment.pdf (discussing early brain development and the effects of abuse and neglect 
on that development); UNIV. OF PA. COLLABORATIVE ON CMTY. INTEGRATION, 
REMOVAL FROM THE HOME: RESULTING TRAUMA 1-2 [hereinafter REMOVAL FROM 
THE HOME], 
http://tucollaborative.org/pdfs/Toolkits_Monographs_Guidebooks/parenting/Facts
heet_4_Resulting_Trauma.pdf (explaining that removing a child from his or her 
family can be just as traumatic as exposure to abuse and neglect and can have 
negative effects that last a lifetime, including psychological and neurobiological 
effects associated with disrupted attachment). 
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intervene and remove a child from his or her home, the psychological 
parent should be treated like a de facto parent from the onset. An 
analysis of California’s de facto parent doctrine shows that this 
extension of rights to psychological parents is a natural one, 
consistent with the policy that first led to California’s development 
of the doctrine. 
 
V. The Judicial Creation of the De Facto Parent Doctrine in 
California is a Partial Solution 
 
The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of 
their children is one of the oldest fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court.
85
 Parents have a 
basic, presumptive right to the care and custody of their child,
86
 and 
this right should only be disturbed in extreme cases where the person 
acts incompatibly with parenthood.
87
 In California, when 
dependency proceedings are initiated, seven essential statutory rights 
protect the parent or legal guardian’s right to the care, custody, and 
control of the child. Only mothers, presumed fathers, adoptive 
parents, and legal guardians are entitled to these rights under 
California dependency law.
88
 Yet, children in California are not 
always raised by their mothers, presumed fathers, adoptive parents, 
or legal guardians. Sometimes, a non-parent caretaker who is a 
psychological parent to the child raises him or her. California has 
                                                          
85
 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
86
 See In re Kieshia E., 859 P.2d at 1300-11.(citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 651 (1972); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 
18, 27 (1981)). 
87
 See GARY C. SEISER & HON. KURT KUMLI, SEISER & KUMLI ON CAL. JUV. 
COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.60(1) (2012) (citing In re B.G., 523 P.2d 
244 (Cal. 1974)).  
88
 Cf. In re Merrick V., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 500 (noting that legal guardians 
appointed through the probate court under the California Probate Code generally 
have the same rights as a parent in such proceedings); In re Carrie W., 2 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 47); In re Emily R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292; In re Zacharia D., 862 P.2d at 
760; In re Sarah C., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420. 
20
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developed a legal doctrine to address this scenario—the de facto 
parent doctrine. 
The de facto parent doctrine is, in fact, judicial recognition of 
the psychological parent. The California Supreme Court first 
recognized the de facto parent doctrine in In re B.G.:  
The fact of biological parenthood may incline an adult 
to feel a strong concern for the welfare of his child, 
but it is not an essential condition; a person who 
assumes the role of a parent, raising the child in his 
own home, may in time acquire an interest in the 
‘companionship, care, custody, and management’ of 
that child. The interest of the ‘de facto parent’ is a 
substantial one, recognized by the decision of this 
court in Guardianship of Shannon, (1933) 218 Cal. 
490, and by courts of other jurisdictions and deserving 
of legal protection.
89
  
 
Numerous lower courts in California then integrated the de facto 
parent doctrine,
90
 and years later, California’s Judicial Council 
incorporated the doctrine into the California Rules of Court: “‘De 
facto parent’ means a person who has been found by the court to 
have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling 
both the child’s physical and psychological needs for care and 
affection, and who has assumed the role for a substantial period.”91 
                                                          
89
 In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 253 (Cal. 1974) (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., 
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17-20 (1973)); cf. In re Kieshia E., 
859 P.2d at 1296 (“The de facto parenthood doctrine simply recognizes that 
persons who have provided a child with daily parental concern, affection, and care 
over substantial time may develop legitimate interests and perspectives, and may 
also present a custodial alternative, which should not be ignored in a juvenile 
dependency proceeding.”).  
90
 See, e.g., In re Jamie G., 241 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing James 
v. McLinden, 341 F. Supp. 1233, 1234-35 (D. Conn. 1969)); Charles S. v. Superior 
Court, 214 Cal. Rptr. 47, 50 (Ct. App. 1985); Katzoff v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. 
Rptr. 178, 180 (Ct. App. 1976).  
91
 CAL. RULES OF CT. R. 5.502(10). Note that the “rules in the California Rules of 
Court are adopted by the Judicial Council of California under the authority of 
article VI, section 6, of the Constitution of the State of California, unless otherwise 
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In designating a de facto parent, the party seeking the status must file 
a motion with the court and bear the burden of proving de facto 
parenthood by a preponderance of the evidence.
92
 The court, in 
making its determination, may look to a variety of factors related to 
the child’s bond with that caretaker.93 Upon a sufficient showing, the 
court may then grant the de facto parent standing to participate as a 
party in disposition hearings and any hearing thereafter.
94
 In 
addition, the de facto parent has the right to be present at the hearing; 
the right to be represented by retained counsel or, at the discretion of 
the court, by appointed counsel; and the right to present evidence.
95
   
In re B.G. involved the de facto parents’ standing at the 
dispositional hearing, and the California Supreme Court held:  
 [D]e facto parents . . . should be permitted to appear 
as parties in juvenile court proceedings. Their standing 
should not depend upon the filing of a petition for 
guardianship . . . nor should their participation be 
restricted to the limited role of an amicus curiae; they 
should be permitted to appear as parties to assert and 
protect their interest in the companionship, care, 
custody and management of the child.
96
   
 
In re B.G. involved the question of de facto parents’ standing 
specifically at the dispositional hearing, therefore, subsequent courts 
                                                                                                                                      
indicated.” See CAL. RULES OF CT. R. 1.3. Notably, it was not California’s 
legislature but the judicial council, the policymaking body of the California courts, 
that adopted the definition of a de facto parent. The judicial council relies on 
California’s Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) to implement its policies. 
92
 See In re Patricia L., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631, 635 (Ct. App. 1992) (outlining that 
factors for determining whether the person is a de facto parent should include 
whether the child is psychologically bonded to the adult, whether the adult 
assumed the day-to-day parental role for a substantial period of time, whether the 
adult has unique knowledge about the child, whether the adult regularly attended 
court hearings, and whether a juvenile court order would permanently foreclose 
contact between the adult and child). 
93
 Id. 
94
 See CAL. RULES OF CT. R. 5.534(e).   
95
 See id. 
96
 See In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 254 (Cal. 1974).  
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have held that de facto parents are only granted standing at the 
dispositional hearing and beyond.
97
 The California Rules of Court 
also limit de facto parent recognition to the dispositional hearing and 
beyond, and do not recognize that status at the initial hearing or 
jurisdictional hearing.
98
 The language and principle behind the 
California Supreme Court’s holding in In re B.G., however, is 
broader and states that de facto parents “should be permitted to 
appear as parties in juvenile court proceedings,” not just at 
dispositional or subsequent hearings, and they “should be permitted 
to appear as parties to assert and protect their interest in the 
companionship, care, custody and management of the child.”99 Yet, 
subsequently, courts have not treated de facto parents as full parties 
to the proceedings, even at the dispositional hearing and later 
hearings, and have limited the role of de facto parents to little more 
than amici curiae.
100
 The California Rules of Court should be 
                                                          
97
 See, e.g., In re Damion B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 742, 744 (Ct. App. 2011); In re 
B.F., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2010); In re P.L., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6, 8 
(Ct. App. 2005); In re Matthew P., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 272 (Ct. App. 1999); In re 
Cynthia C., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 1997); In re Patricia L., 11 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 635.  
98
 Note that, in interpreting this rule, the usual rules of statutory construction apply. 
See Conservatorship of Coombs, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 801 (Ct. App. 1998). 
However, as pointed out by the court in In re Joel H., because California’s Judicial 
Council promulgated the rule of court, and not the legislature, inferences cannot be 
drawn regarding legislative intent. See In re Joel H., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878, 883 (Ct. 
App. 1993). For example, in speaking to whether de facto parents have standing to 
appeal, the court held that, to the extent the rule of court conflicts with In re B.G. 
and the CALIFORNIA WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE, the rule of court is void. 
See id. (citing In re Rachael C., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473, 479 (Ct. App. 1991); In re 
B.G., 523 P.2d 244). 
99
 See In re B.G., 523 P.2d at 254 (emphasis added). 
100
 See In re Damion B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 744 (stating that de facto parents did 
not have the right to cross-examine witnesses at 18-month review hearing); In re 
B.F., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565; In re Patricia L., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635 (de facto 
parent had no right to custody or continued placement, and therefore did not have 
legal standing to complain of placement of child with new prospective adoptive 
couple); Clifford S. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 333, 337-38 (Ct. App. 
1995); In re Matthew P., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272; In re Jamie G., 241 Cal. Rptr. 
869, 875 (Ct. App. 1987) (de facto parents are not entitled to reunification services, 
23
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modified to reflect the broader principles in In re B.G. and, 
additionally, these principles should apply to all hearings, including 
the initial hearing.  
Currently, de facto parents in California have no right to 
appear with counsel at the initial hearing or adjudication hearing, no 
right to challenge the veracity of the State’s petition, no right to 
reunification services, no right to custody, and no right to visitation 
with the child.
101
 This limitation is true even in cases in which the 
natural parents never appeared, and “the court was placed in the 
position of simply rubber-stamping the social worker’s factual 
assertions and recommendations.”102 California’s de facto parent 
doctrine, therefore, provides insufficient protection for the rights and 
relationship of the psychological parent and child.  
More can be done to protect the relationship of the 
psychological parent and child in dependency proceedings. If there is 
no legal parent present in the child’s life when the state intervenes to 
remove a child from the psychological parent’s home and 
dependency proceedings are initiated, the psychological parent 
should be recognized as a de facto parent from the onset of the case. 
A psychological parent who has assumed primary caretaking 
responsibilities for a child over a significant period of time should 
have the same rights and protections that a de facto parent is afforded 
in dependency proceedings.  
In other words, if the psychological parent would otherwise 
qualify as a de facto parent under the law, but for the stage of the 
proceedings, the court should recognize the psychological parent as a 
de facto parent. This status would be solely for the purposes of the 
dependency proceedings and would eliminate dependency law’s 
unequal treatment of otherwise similarly situated caretakers. 
Moreover, it would be a natural extension of existing case law and, 
                                                                                                                                      
and therefore lack standing to challenge the denial of reunification services or 
contest the reasonableness of services that are offered).  
101
 See In re Damion B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 747 (stating that de facto parents did 
not have the right to cross-examine witnesses at 18-month review hearing); In re 
B.F., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565. But see In re Matthew P., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274 
(stating that de facto parents cannot be completely shut out of the proceedings). 
102
 See In re Rachael C., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. 
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similar to the original concept of the de facto parent, could be 
judicially created and maintained to protect the rights of 
psychological parents and their children. 
Decisional law limiting the rights of de facto parents is, in 
part, a consequence of weighing legal parents’ greater substantive 
and procedural rights against the interests of de facto parents.
103
 
However, granting a psychological parent the same rights afforded to 
a de facto parent, but at the onset of a dependency case, would not 
diminish the legal parents’ rights, especially if the legal parents are 
absent and not involved in the court proceedings. The court must still 
enforce the procedural due process protections to which even an 
absent parent is entitled.
104
  
Treating psychological parents like de facto parents at every 
stage of a dependency case would better serve the interests of the 
child and better inform the court of the child’s history and needs.105 
                                                          
103
 Notably, in cases where the de facto parents raised the child for a significant 
period of time, the allegations related to the removal of the child from the de facto 
parents’ care, and the natural parents were significantly absent from the child’s 
life, California courts have been more generous conferring due process rights. See, 
e.g., In re Jamie G., 241 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (citing James v. McLinden, 341 F. Supp. 
1233, 1234-35 (D. Conn. 1969)); Charles S. v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 
50; Katzoff v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 180). Courts have been less 
generous in cases where the child was removed from the de facto parent’s custody 
at the onset and there was no prior, significant relationship between the de facto 
parent and child. See In re P.L., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6, 8-9 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding 
that the de facto parent did not have rights when the de facto parent was the foster 
parent with no prior relationship to child who was removed from mother’s care at 
initial hearing); In re Cynthia C., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 8  (holding that the de facto 
parents did not have rights when the de facto parents were the caretakers for only a 
few months and the child was subsequently removed from their home due to 
violence and prior child abuse referrals relating to the caretakers and their own 
children); In re Matthew P., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 275 (finding that because the 
children were removed from the parents’ custody at initial hearing and de facto 
parents were foster parents in whose home the children were subsequently placed, 
de facto parents had due process interests that should be considered). 
104
 See e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 294 (West 2013) (requiring due diligence 
in attempt to locate and serve absent parent). 
105
 See generally Josh Gupta-Kagan, Children, Kin, and Court: Designing Third 
Party Custody Policy to Protect Children, Third Parties, and Parents, 12 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 62 (2008) (arguing, in part, that “states should permit 
25
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As a small, first step toward protecting the relationship of the child 
and psychological parent in child welfare proceedings, California’s 
Judicial Council should amend Rule 5.534(e) of the California Rules 
of Court, that states, in part, “the court may recognize the child’s 
present or previous custodians as de facto parents and grant standing 
to participate as parties in disposition hearings and any hearing 
thereafter . . .”106 By replacing the word “disposition” with “initial,” 
the Judicial Council would allow courts, at their discretion, to grant 
standing to de facto parents, such as psychological parents, at the 
initial and adjudication hearings. While they would not be afforded 
all of the rights of a parent or legal guardian, these psychological 
parents would at least have standing, the right to counsel, and the 
right to present evidence during the most critical hearings at the 
beginning of the case. 
Permitting psychological parents—whether a grandparent, a 
stepparent, an extended relative, or non-relative caretaker—to 
participate and seek custody of the child in dependency proceedings 
would go far to protect the relationship of the child and his or her 
psychological parent, and mitigate any harm to the child that would 
be caused by severing that attachment. Moreover, by welcoming the 
participation of and input from the one person who has been the 
primary caretaker for the child on a day-to-day basis, the court would 
have a better, more intimate understanding of the child’s unique 
history, individual needs, and best interests moving forward.
107
  
 
VI. De Facto Parent Doctrine Nationwide 
 
 Like California, twenty-two states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted their own equivalents to the de facto parent 
doctrine, either by statute or judicial creation, using a variety of 
terms to refer to their definition of the de facto parent, including 
                                                                                                                                      
broad third party standing to seek custody once a neglect case has been opened to 
help children and families find positive alternatives to and quick exits from the 
neglect system”). 
106
 CAL. RULES OF CT. R. 5.534(e).  
107
 Gupta-Kagan, supra note 105, at 76. 
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psychological parent, person acting in loco parentis, de facto parent, 
and parent by estoppel.
108
 For example, the supreme courts of 
Colorado,
109
 Maryland,
110
 South Carolina,
111
 Washington,
112
 and 
West Virginia,
113
 have all adopted their own versions of the doctrine. 
                                                          
108
 See De Facto Parent Recognition, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/de_facto_parenting_statutes (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2012) (listing Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the 
District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia as having de 
facto parenting statutes); see, e.g., Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 151 (Alaska 
2002) (using the term “psychological parent”); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 
891 (Mass. 1999); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 517 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1987) (adopting an “equitable parent” doctrine to describe a person who played 
parental role but who is not legal parent); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 
2000) (holding same-sex partner was [de facto] parent and awarded custody of 
child); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 61 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (applying de 
facto standard); Matter of Guardianship & Conservatorship of Nelson, 519 N.W.2d 
15, 20 (N.D. 1994); Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1984) 
(awarding grandmother custody of six-year-old she raised since the child was six 
months of age); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Lane Cnty., Children’s Servs. Div. 
v. Lauffenberger, 777 P.2d 954, 959 (Or. 1989) (awarding grandparents custody of 
seven-year-old that they raised for most of her life, as opposed to awarding custody 
to the child’s father); Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 168 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2006); Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, 552 N.W.2d 843, 848 (S.D. 1996); In re Parentage 
of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 165 (Wash. 2005) (en banc); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 
138, 142 (W. Va. 2005) (using the term “psychological parent”); In re Custody of 
H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 451 (Wis. 1995); see also Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 
676 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (App. Div. 1998) (applying equitable estoppel to protect 
bond between child and non-biological father). 
109
 In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 560-61 (Colo. App. 2004). 
110
 Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 82 (Md. 2008) (recognizing de facto 
parent status in “exceptional circumstances”). 
111
 Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 743-44 (S.C. 2008) (approving the test set 
forth in Middleton, 633 S.E.2d 162, quoting In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 
N.W.2d at 435-36 that outlined a four-prong test to qualify as a “psychological 
parent” or de facto parent). 
112
 In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 177.  
113
 In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d at 142; see also In re Custody of Cottrill, 346 
S.E.2d 47, 49 (W. Va. 1986) (awarding grandmother custody of eleven-year-old 
child that she raised, as opposed to awarding custody to the child’s mother). 
27
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Additionally, the legislatures of Delaware,
114
 District of Columbia,
115
 
Indiana,
116
 and Kentucky
117
 have established such a doctrine through 
statute.    
Washington defined the psychological parent, in its adoption 
of the de facto parent doctrine, as the person who has a parent-like 
relationship based on day-to-day interaction, companionship, and 
shared experiences of the child and adult.
118
 While Washington’s 
dependency statutes do not include psychological parent within the 
definition of legal parent, the statutes do allow individuals who meet 
the definition of psychological parent to intervene in dependency 
proceedings.
119
  
  The Alaska Supreme Court, in their adoption of the de facto 
parent doctrine, also clearly defined a psychological parent:  
[O]ne who, on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, 
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a 
child’s psychological needs for an adult. This adult 
                                                          
114
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2013). 
115
 D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2013). 
116
 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-2-8, 31-17-2-8.5 (West 2013) (outlining the 
threshold requirements for de facto parent status); see also In re Guardianship of 
Stackhouse, 538 N.E.2d 990, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (awarding step-
grandmother who effectively became child’s mother, rather than grandfather, 
custody of orphaned four-year-old child).  
117
 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2012) (defining “de facto custodian” as 
a “person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the 
primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the 
person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three (3) years of 
age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age or 
older or has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services” and 
granting the de facto custodian the same standing in custody matters that is given 
to each natural parent). 
118
 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 . 
119
 See In re Parentage of J.A.B., 191 P.3d 71, 75-76 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); In re 
Dependency of M.R., 899 P.2d 1286, 1287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that 
psychological parent does not fit within the definition of “parent” under 
Washington’s statute governing dependency proceedings, but the trial court may 
allow a psychological parent to intervene). But see In re Dependency of J.H., 815 
P.2d 1380, 1386 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (stating that foster parents who allege 
they are psychological parents have no right to intervene). 
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becomes an essential focus of the child’s life, for he is 
not only the source of the fulfillment of the child’s 
needs, but also the source of his emotional and 
psychological needs . . . .The wanted child is one who 
is loved, valued, appreciated, and viewed as an 
essential person by the adult who cares for him . . . . 
This relationship may exist between a child and any 
adult; it depends not upon the category into which the 
adult falls—biological, adoptive, foster, or common-
law—but upon the quality and mutuality of the 
interaction.
120
 
 
The supreme courts of Colorado, West Virginia, and Wisconsin also 
adopted similar definitions for psychological parents.
121
 
Yet, in nineteen states, recognition of de facto parents 
remains uncertain, and eight states refuse to recognize the doctrine 
altogether.
122
 States that adopted the doctrine, either legislatively or 
by judicial creation, acknowledged the existence of psychological 
parents and non-traditional families as well as the importance of 
                                                          
120
 See Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 2004). 
121
 See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 560-61 (explaining that a psychological parent 
is a person with whom the child has “deep emotional bonds such that the child 
recognizes the person, independent of the legal form of the relationship, as a parent 
from whom they receive daily guidance and nurturance”); In re Clifford K., 619 
S.E.2d at 156-57 (noting that a ‘psychological parent’ is someone who has 
established “such a meaningful relationship with a minor child so as to be entitled 
to greater protection under the law than would ordinarily be afforded to one who is 
not the biological or adoptive parent of the child” and “who, on a continuing day-
to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills 
a child’s psychological and physical needs for a parent and provides for the child’s 
emotional and financial support”); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at  435-
36. 
122
 See De Facto Parent Recognition, supra note 108; see, e.g., Van v. Zahorik, 
597 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Mich. 1999); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 
(N.Y. 1991); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 816 (Utah 2007) (declining to adopt 
de facto parent doctrine or psychological parent doctrine); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 
A.2d 682, 688 (Vt. 1997) (declining to adopt the de facto parent doctrine). 
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protecting the relationship between the child and psychological 
parent.
123
  
 As seen in the California context detailed above, most states 
only recognize mothers, presumed fathers, adoptive parents, and 
legal guardians as parties in child welfare proceedings and grant 
rights to de facto parents in limited cases.
124
 These states, generally, 
do not recognize psychological parents outside the context of de 
facto parents. Consequently, the rights that are essential to protecting 
the parent-child relationship—the right to notice, the right to appear 
with counsel, standing to participate fully in proceedings, the right to 
appeal, and the right to reunification services—are denied to 
psychological parents who have not yet been designated de facto 
parents. These caretakers have none of those rights, even at the most 
critical preliminary stages of child welfare proceedings, unless the 
state adopts specific statutory exceptions. Further, even in states that 
have adopted the de facto parent doctrine, either statutorily or by 
judicial creation, it is unclear from a survey of statutes and case law 
whether psychological parents who qualify as de facto parents have 
any rights during the initial hearings of child welfare proceedings. In 
the few states that do recognize third parties, such as psychological 
parents, there are still arduous standing requirements that must be 
met.
125
 
                                                          
123
 See generally Lauren Valastro, Comment, Training Wheels Needed: Balancing 
the Parental Presumption, the Best Interest Standard, and the Need to Protect 
Children, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 503 (2012) (discussing the psychological parent 
doctrine in Texas and nationwide). 
124
 See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(49) (West 2013); MICH. CT. R. § 
3.903(A)(19) (“Party” includes the petitioner, child, respondent and parent, 
guardian, or legal custodian); MICH. CT. R. § 3.920; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
432B.080 (West 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. §§ 614, 616, 617, 624, 1046(b)(ii) 
(McKinney 2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.024(a) (West 2013) (“‘Parent’ 
means the mother, a man presumed to be the father, a man legally determined to be 
the father, a man who has been adjudicated to be the father by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, a man who has acknowledged his paternity under applicable law, or an 
adoptive mother or father.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(13) (West 2013).  
125
 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-202 (West 2013) (providing standing, 
right to counsel, advisement of legal rights, and right to request a jury trial at the 
first appearance in a child welfare proceeding to the “respondent parent, guardian, 
30
Children's Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol33/iss2/4
Children’s Legal Rights Journal    Volume 33, Fall 2013   
 
Adapting to the Modern Family  
 
297 
 
In New York, however, the psychological parent may be 
awarded the same rights as a legal parent from the onset of child 
abuse and neglect proceedings if the psychological parent qualifies 
as the “respondent” in the case.126 A New York statute broadly 
defines a “respondent” as “any parent or other person legally 
responsible for the child’s care who is alleged to have abused or 
neglected the child.”127 The term “person legally responsible” is 
defined as any individual regularly or continually in the household 
who has assumed the parenting role.
128
 Depending on the specific 
facts of each case, courts have found the legally responsible person 
to be individuals, such as a parent’s cohabitant or boyfriend,129 or an 
                                                                                                                                      
or legal custodian” only); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.115, 26.44.120 (West 
2013) (providing notice requirements for “parents” and “noncustodial parent” 
when child is taken into protective custody); see also People in Interest of C.P. v. 
F.P., 524 P.2d 316, 319 (Colo. App. 1974) (stating that the court at dispositional 
stage need not give notice to or consider rights of relatives seeking custody if no 
timely application is made and that joinder of grandmother as “party” to 
proceedings at disposition is proper when petitioner is seeking custody). See 
generally John W. Ellis, Comment, Yours, Mine, Ours?—Why the Texas 
Legislature Should Simplify Caretaker Consent Capabilities for Minor Children 
and the Implications of the Addition of Chapter 34 to the Texas Family Code, 42 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 987 (2010) (discussing Texas’ legislative amendments to 
expand informal caregiver authority, including standing to file suit affecting the 
parent-child relationship). See generally Lawrence Schlam, Children “Not in the 
Physical Custody of One of [Their] Parents:” The Superior Rights Doctrine and 
Third-Party Standing Under the Uniform Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
Act, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 405 (2000) (discussing generally superior rights doctrine and 
the obstacles to third party standing for psychological parents in child custody 
proceedings in Illinois and several states).  
126
 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1023 (McKinney 2013) (providing notice for “person 
legally responsible” that temporary protective order would be sought and 
preliminary hearing held); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1033-b (McKinney 2013) 
(providing for advisement and right to court-appointed attorney for indigent 
respondents at initial hearing).  
127
 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(a) (McKinney 2013).  
128
 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(g) (defining “person legally responsible” as the 
person who has assumed the parenting role who may be found in the household 
continually or at regular intervals). 
129
 See In re Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (App. Div. 1999). 
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uncle who lives in the family home.
130
 In contrast, courts have found 
that neither a minor sibling
131
 nor a grandparent’s boyfriend who did 
not reside in the home
132
 is a legally responsible person.   
The court’s determination depends on an evaluation of the 
relationship of the person to the child and whether that person 
assumed a parental role.
133
 If the person meets the “legally 
responsible” standard, he or she is entitled, at the initial hearing and 
thereafter, to notice, advisement of his or her legal rights, standing as 
a full party in the proceedings, and court-appointed counsel if he or 
she is indigent.
134
 This statutory scheme protects the relationship of 
the psychological parent and child when child welfare proceedings 
are initiated, and adequately addresses the concerns raised in the 
illustrative case above.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In California, as in many states, when dependency 
proceedings are initiated, there are seven essential rights afforded by 
statute—the right to notice, the right to appear with counsel, standing 
to participate fully in all proceedings, the right to physical custody of 
the child, the right to visitation, the right to appeal, and the right to 
reunification services. Generally, only mothers, presumed fathers, 
adoptive parents, and legal guardians are entitled to these rights 
under California dependency law. Until these statutes are expanded 
to embrace psychological parents and afford them the same rights as 
legal guardians, dependency courts should take action to cure this 
                                                          
130
 See In re Dayquon G., 803 N.Y.S.2d 510, 510 (App. Div. 2005). 
131
 See Catherine G. v. Cnty. of Essex, 818 N.E.2d 1110, 1112-13 (N.Y. 2004). 
132
 See In re Brent HH., 765 N.Y.S.2d 671, 674 (App. Div. 2003).  
133
 See generally Matter of Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (N.Y. 1996) 
(recognizing that while parenting functions will not always be performed by a legal 
parent, determination of whether a person is acting in loco parentis is a 
discretionary decision that will depend on the facts of each individual case).  
134
 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1023 (McKinney 2013) (providing notice for “person 
legally responsible” that temporary protective order would be sought and 
preliminary hearing held); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1033-b (McKinney 2013) 
(providing for advisement and right to court-appointed attorney for indigent 
respondents at initial hearing). 
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problem. If courts, within their discretion, extended these rights to 
psychological parents who would otherwise qualify as de facto 
parents, this practice would better protect modern families in 
California and nationwide. 
Acknowledging the psychological parent from the onset of 
dependency proceedings in the few cases where the psychological 
parent would otherwise qualify as a de facto parent, and there is no 
parent present in the child’s life, would better protect the interests of 
child—in relative placement, visitation, continuing connections with 
extended family members, and critically, in reunification with their 
psychological parent. As the primary caretaker who has cared for the 
child on a day-to-day basis for a significant period of time, the 
psychological parent would have unrivaled insight into the child’s 
recent past and unique needs. Therefore, the psychological parent’s 
participation in the proceedings would better shape the court’s 
understanding of the child. 
Moreover, two non-parent caretakers who share the same 
degree of kinship to a child, whether psychological or by blood, who 
assume the same parental role for the same period of time, and who 
appear in dependency court for the same reasons, would be treated 
equally when dependency proceedings are initiated. It would not 
matter that one non-parent caretaker obtained legal guardianship 
before the initial hearing and the other did not. Moreover, any 
conflict with the legal parents’ rights could be resolved under 
existing dependency law as it currently treats de facto parents.  
Extending essential statutory rights to psychological parents 
in these unique dependency cases creates fundamental fairness where 
disparate treatment once occurred. Most importantly, it protects the 
welfare of the child in these families. Severing the secure and 
significant attachments that form between a child and caregiver can 
have profoundly traumatic effects on the child. These include altered 
brain development, and impacted physical, emotional, and mental 
long-term development.
135
 Taking steps to recognize and protect the 
                                                          
135
 Barnett & Hamblen, supra note 84 (discussing the importance of the child-
caregiver attachment); see also UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF MALTREATMENT 
ON BRAIN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 84 (discussing the effects of abuse and 
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attachments between the child and psychological parent would 
mitigate the potential harm to the child and ensure the fair and equal 
protection of non-traditional families. 
As family dynamics evolve, so must child welfare law. Over 
the last forty years, there has been a significant rise in the number of 
non-traditional families. The number of children raised by 
psychological parents is increasing. A judicial rethinking of the 
psychological parent’s role in dependency proceedings or a change 
in pertinent legislation is necessary for the sake of these children and 
the modern families in which they are raised. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
neglect on early brain development); REMOVAL FROM THE HOME, supra note 84 
(explaining that removing a child from his or her family can be just as traumatic as 
exposure to abuse and neglect and can have negative effects that last a lifetime, 
including psychological and neurobiological effects associated with disrupted 
attachment).  
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